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NFB NIE 13-10-82

Political Succession in China

National Intelligence Estimate

~~Secret~~

NIE 13-10-82
27 July 1982

Copy 291

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

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NIE 13-10-82

POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN CHINA

Information available as of 19 July 1982 was used in the preparation of this Estimate.

SECRET

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and the Treasury.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate concentrates (1) on the outlook for political succession in the People's Republic of China (PRC) over the next few years: that is, until 1986 or so; and (2) on the significance of that outlook for the United States.

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The problems China faces are so enormous that regardless of who succeeds Deng Xiaoping, its present tough, de facto boss, most of the major patterns of Chinese politics and policies will continue. China will remain a vast LDC, marked by wariness of commitment and lack of adequate technical skills. Economic development will be halting and uneven. The PRC will tend to remain a closed authoritarian society. The partnership with the United States will continue to be arm's length in character, the question of Taiwan constituting a principal ongoing source of friction.

At the moment, the transfer of political authority to Deng's picked successors, party Chairman Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang, appears to be off to a fairly smooth start. Their succession to top power will nonetheless be subject to numerous hazards: their requirement to achieve demonstrable results; considerable continuing opposition to their bold policies from within the military (PLA), the party, and the bureaucracy; and—especially—their need to establish themselves as national figures with potent top cadre support of their own by the time Deng leaves the scene.

The possibility cannot therefore be excluded that strident or sharply divided regimes might return in China, at the expense of political stability, economic advance, and fairly predictable foreign policy conduct.

On balance, however, the chances favor a succession to power of such officials as Hu and Zhao, and a general continuance by them of fairly pragmatic courses. And, the longer Deng remains active the better the succession prospects of Hu and Zhao. In the short term they would almost certainly have to share power in a collective arrangement of some kind with party elders and a few senior PLA figures. But if Deng remains in power until, say, 1985 or beyond, Hu and Zhao would probably be able to establish themselves as first among equals within the PRC's succession leadership. Thereafter, one or the other of these two figures would become dominant.

It will be of great consequence to US interests that succession in China not jeopardize the strategic benefits the United States derives from its relationships with the PRC. Broad US interests will tend to be

best served if generally pragmatic policies are continued by successors like Hu and Zhao.

Should Hu, Zhao, or other pragmatists indeed come to rule the PRC, they would place continued nationalistic emphasis on the Chinese "motherland," less on ideology. Such a PRC would retain correct—though not necessarily close—relations with the United States, and could be expected to explore ways and means of lessening the level of hostility with the USSR, where a parallel succession process might well also be taking place. A pragmatic regime would nonetheless stop short of basically changing China's anti-Soviet orientation. Should a strident backlash regime come to power, it would probably not lessen the level of hostility with the USSR.

KEY JUDGMENTS

1. The succession of political authority in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a dynamic, ongoing process: it began some years before the death of Mao Zedong; it continues now; it will not be completed when China's present boss, Deng Xiaoping, leaves the scene. Even then, "succession" in any other than an immediate sense will not have occurred and more leadership permutations will prove necessary before the transition of political authority from Maoist to post-Maoist China can be said to have been fully accomplished.

2. In such an interim succession, most of the vast problems which mark China will continue. So will many of the responses of China's leaders to those problems—regardless of who those leaders may be:

- China will remain a poor, vast LDC that is developing only slowly. There will continue to be a chasm between the PRC's goals and capabilities. Economic development will be halting and uneven.
- China's leaders—any leaders—will meet great difficulty in coping with the residue of Cultural Revolution folly: widespread lethargy and cynicism in the society, a dearth of skilled technicians, and a bureaucracy grown wary of commitment.
- Whatever the degree of development achieved, the PRC will tend to remain a tight, closed, authoritarian society. China's leaders will seek technical assistance from the outside world, but not to such extent as might truly open up China to significant "foreign bourgeois" influences.
- The PRC will still be faced with the problem of how best to deter Soviet power and pressures, and Beijing's leaders—any Chinese leaders—will almost certainly wish to do so without permitting a significantly closer partnership with the United States to displace the present, somewhat arm's length, Sino-US relationship.
- Furthermore, the Taiwan problem is not a transient one, as far as Chinese leaders are concerned. It will continue to be a divisive element between Beijing and Washington, and the possibility cannot be excluded that it might come to be a major variable affecting not only Chinese policies, but Chinese politics and succession as well.

3. It is against such a background that the succession picture in post-Deng China will be played out. For some time Deng has been trying to institutionalize the passing of political authority to his two chief lieutenants, party Chairman Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang. No direct challenges to them exist at present; indeed, the most recent appointments of new officials represent clear victories for Hu, Zhao, and their associates. The succession to top authority of Hu and Zhao will nonetheless remain a somewhat fragile proposition.

— Even though their patron, Deng, is well on his way to packing the PRC's governing apparatus with his own people, this tough party veteran does not himself enjoy an unchallenged position. He will continue to have to operate within the confines of collective leadership, and will again have to retreat when he provokes too much opposition from more cautious and conservative leaders.

— Such opposition to Deng's radical changes will remain considerable, albeit often muted and foot-dragging in character. The principal sources of such opposition will continue to be certain old guard leaders in the PLA (China's military, the People's Liberation Army), certain party leaders (national and provincial) brought to power during the Cultural Revolution years, and China's gigantic, lethargic bureaucracy.

— Economic collapse or a major failure of the PRC's present development programs are improbable, but Deng must solidify the position of his heirs sufficiently in the relatively short actuarial time available to him, so that political succession can pass in an orderly manner.

— Hazards abound, and if Deng, Hu, and Zhao do not bring demonstrable improvement to the life of China they could become the skeptics' newest scapegoats. This danger will exist even though this problem may be primarily a symbolic one: that is, not so much that the policies of Deng and his associates must succeed in bringing a specific degree of actual progress in this or that aspect of development, but that failure to achieve reasonable progress will give various rivals political weapons with which to contest the nailing down of political dominance by Deng and his associates.

— Their succession will hang in important measure on how well they have established themselves as national figures with potent top cadre support of their own by the time Deng dies, becomes incapacitated, or leaves the scene.

4. Should Deng depart in the relatively near future (over the next year or so), Hu and Zhao would almost certainly have to share power, probably in a collective arrangement of some kind with party elders and a few senior military (PLA) figures.

5. Should Deng remain in power for a longer period (say, 1985 or beyond), then Hu and Zhao would probably be able to establish themselves, at least initially, as first-among-equals within the PRC's successor leadership.

— No confident estimates are justified as to what would occur then, for, in addition to the domestic and foreign circumstances of the time, the question would soon arise as to whether the succession of Hu and Zhao was to be one of shared authority, or of one superior to the other partner, or of just one leader alone.

— There are countless precedents in Chinese history for just one leader, and some precedents (imperial, republican, and PRC) for a prime technician associated with the boss—the most recent example, Mao and Zhou Enlai. Zhao Ziyang has some of the makings of a Zhou Enlai. But Zhao is a tough, able official who might outlast Hu. One thing is clear: there are no examples in Chinese history of truly shared top authority.

6. In any event, should the succession process elevate Hu, Zhao, or other pragmatists to top positions, such a PRC would place continued emphasis on China and the Chinese "motherland," less on ideology. It would continue to open itself up somewhat to foreign technology and presence—but only to a limited degree. It would keep its basic ties with the United States, but would continue to distance itself somewhat from us, to bargain toughly, to criticize many US policies, and increasingly to identify itself with the Third World. As part of this process, such a succession regime would probably explore ways and means of lessening the present level of hostility with the USSR—although stopping short of basically changing China's anti-Soviet orientation.

7. On balance, the chances favor a fairly manageable succession of power to such officials as Hu and Zhao, and a general continuance by them of fairly pragmatic PRC courses, at home and abroad. Further, it is clear that virtually all PRC leaders wish to avoid a return to the extremes of the Cultural Revolution. Nonetheless, given the enormity of China's problems, and the many adverse contingencies that might affect China's politics and policies over the next few years, the possibility cannot be excluded that intense instability might return in some new forms. Some combination of critical economic setbacks or political factionalism could occur over the next few years that would bring to

power strident or sharply divided regimes of some kind which would cut back sharply on the generally pragmatic courses Deng, Hu, and Zhao champion. In such circumstances China's development prospects would suffer, Beijing's behavior would be more difficult to anticipate, Sino-US relations would almost certainly be further set back, and the Soviets would be given new opportunities to try to exploit China's vulnerabilities. Such a Chinese backlash regime, however, would probably not lessen the level of hostility with the USSR.

8. The United States will have considerable stake in the outcome of political succession in China. It will be of great consequence to US interests that the transfer of political authority there not jeopardize the strategic benefits the United States derives from its relationships with the PRC. Broad US interests will tend to be best served if generally pragmatic policies are continued by successors like Hu and Zhao.

10. Indeed, Soviet considerations will certainly interact with the working out of future Chinese politics and policies. The transferring of political authority in the PRC will be accompanied by a parallel process in the USSR. The successors of Brezhnev will probably not seek a genuine or full Sino-Soviet reconciliation, but they may see profit in some lessening of the level of hostility with the PRC. Meanwhile, even though Beijing's leaders will continue to view the American connection as a necessary adjunct to the PRC's development, the value to them of that connection will continue to hang importantly on their perceptions of the degree to which US world policies vis-a-vis the USSR benefit the PRC's security and strategic interests.

DISCUSSION

A. The Significance of the Succession Question

1. The succession of political authority that Deng Xiaoping has arranged must be considered a fragile phenomenon even though he and his associates have of late been successfully salting the PRC's governing bureaucracies with their own people. Myriad problems hazard an effective transition of authority to Deng's heirs presumptive, party Chairman Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang. The problems Deng and his successors face are so enormous and so ingrained in the system and society he has inherited from Mao Zedong, that they will not be quickly exorcised by new reformist Chinese policies, whatever their character and whoever their champion.

2. In the broadest sense China has been seeking a system of political succession ever since the collapse of imperial authority there. Today the succession of political authority in the PRC remains a dynamic, ongoing process. It began some years before the death of Mao; it will not be completed when Deng leaves the scene. Regardless of what leaders succeed him, "succession" in any other than an immediate sense will not have occurred and more leadership permutations may prove necessary before the transition of political authority from Maoist to post-Maoist China can be said to have been fully accomplished.

3. No observers—American, Soviet, or other—will really know how a new China is going to influence the world, for good or ill, until changes yet to come have transformed present-day China. Succession in this dynastic sense is doubtless decades away. What mainland China therefore faces in the near term is another interim transfer of political authority, within a continuing much longer period of full succession.

4. For this interim period the fairly pragmatic policies of Deng, Hu, Zhao, and their associates give the Chinese perhaps their best chance since the mid-1950s to deal with China's many problems and to help create a strengthened, more modern society. Available evidence, however, makes it difficult to be very sanguine about any leaders' success in achieving China's ambitious goals in the near future. At best, chances during that period favor only partial successes scattered here and there in the economic life of China. The problems now facing Deng and his associates— and indeed all of China's leaders— are staggering. With a vast population of over a billion, China is still largely a poor and backward society, by far the world's largest LDC. Its slow agricultural growth in relation to population (agricultural output is only 7 percent higher than in 1957) barely keeps pace with current levels of per capita consumption. Its per capita GNP is a mere US $256 (estimated). Its energy resource development is lagging. It does not have the capacity rapidly to modernize itself alone. It has only limited means of attracting foreign capital or paying for needed commodities and technology from abroad.

5. The succession to Deng will be played out against a backdrop that includes not only problems which the PRC shares with many other of the world's LDCs, but also numerous difficulties unique to the PRC. Foremost is the scale of the development task facing China and the audacity of the goals successive leaders have set; the PRC has come a long way, but it has a long way to go. Also, China—including Deng's China—is still a suspicious, closed society which in many respects purposely cuts itself off from the world. China's leaders are economically unable and politically hesitant to permit large numbers of foreign technicians and plants into China. These leaders continue a hostile relationship with the USSR that demands maintaining a Chinese military establishment of considerable proportions. China needs vast scores of skilled administrators and technicians, yet the Cultural Revolution has cost China nearly a generation's worth of trained administrators, professionals, and technicians.

6. Moreover, party turmoil in China over the past three decades has devoured much of its own leader-

ship. Cadres at all levels whose policies later go sour cannot only be pulled down, but can then be damned for having been wrong all along. The resulting mass confusion and intimidation has traumatized wide sectors of China's population, made them wary of commitment, and alienated them from the rhetoric of politics. This process has sapped the regime's ability to generate unique energies once again from the people—as Mao did so well at the PRC's outset. The most grievous damage these processes have wrought is widespread individual cynicism, indolence, and disregard for society at large.



7. To this situation Deng Xiaoping brings remarkable resiliency. This tough veteran of party infighting has climbed back to the top from three purgings. He has worked his will on a reluctant bureaucracy and military, even though they in turn have forced him to back off on many goals and paces of advance. In the Chinese case, Deng is attempting to create what is in fact clearly a revisionist Communist regime and society. And, Chinese leadership has ceased damning the USSR for being "revisionist"—the present Soviet sins having become "bureaucratism" and "social imperialism."

8. Deng must solidify the top position of his heirs sufficiently in the relatively short actuarial time available to him, so that political succession can pass in an orderly manner. Hazards abound, and if Deng, Hu, and Zhao do not continue to bring some demonstrable improvement to the life of China they could become the skeptics' newest scapegoats. The history of the PRC shows that China's leaders and people can tolerate considerable economic setback and disarray. The need for some progress in the present context of political succession is not so much an economic problem, however, as it is a symbolic one: that is, not so much that the policies of Deng and his associates must succeed in bringing a specific degree of actual progress in this or that aspect of development, but that failure to achieve reasonable progress will give various rivals political weapons with which to contest the nailing down of political dominance by Deng and his associates.

9. Succession will not hinge alone on measurable economic success, technical considerations, or even the personal political power positions achieved. For all their skill, the political style of Deng and his associates is in certain respects an alien one to most Chinese, for in so freely acknowledging the weaknesses of China and its need of outside support these leaders risk injuring Chinese pride and provoking widespread resentments among the Chinese. This is a terribly sharp break from what Mao provided China: for with all his drawbacks and changes of line Mao did call up an intangible but very real strength in the makeup of the Chinese, their traditional ethnocentrism and sense of moral superiority. Such sentiments still dominate not only the bulk of China's huge population, but the party itself, which expanded rapidly during the Cultural Revolution.

10. That Deng has brought some order to the PRC's politics and is attempting to restructure China's government and to arrange for succession attests to the skill with which he has fashioned an exquisite balancing of political forces. The fate of his successors will be largely determined by the working out of domestic currents, as has been the case with all Chinese leaders. But as foreign influences helped shape events in imperial and republican China, so foreign influences—particularly Soviet and US—will to some degree affect political leadership and succession in the PRC.

B. The Present Leadership Situation

The Setting

11. There is no question that Deng Xiaoping remains the PRC's foremost leader and policymaker, even though he now operates more from behind the scenes. He is the acknowledged driving force behind implementation of the "four modernizations." [1] The present mainline policies continue to reflect Deng's desired programs, as do the present ambitious efforts to streamline the bureaucracy and pack it with more responsive officials. The recently promulgated draft Constitution is a gain for Deng and his associates, as are the particular namelists of new officials appointed or promoted. Deng and his close associates have the initiative; others react to them and their policies.

12. There are nonetheless definite limits to Deng's influence. He cannot be compared to Mao in political stature. Deng is obliged to share power with other leaders and to operate in the context of collective leadership rather than dictating policy—as demonstrated by the numerous retreats Deng has had to make in the last few years when he provoked staunch opposition from the more cautious and conservative. The constraints on his authority have been registered in many ways. It took over a year (and six revisions) to produce the mid-1981 Sixth Plenum's authoritative Resolution, which among other things set forth the present gospel on how to think—at least at the moment—about Mao and his mistakes. Deng has joined conservative party and military leaders in sharply delimiting the earlier area of permissible criticism of the regime. Deng was unable to submit the revised state constitution to the National People's Congress in December 1981, as had been originally scheduled. The delay almost certainly involved ongoing discord over such key issues as setting forth the formal relation of the party to the state, naming a chief of state and a commander in chief of the PLA, and in particular determining the command relationships among the PLA, the party, and the government.

13. Indeed, the limits to Deng's authority were clearly registered in Deng's having had himself to assume the post of Chairman of the party's Military Commission in 1981 after considerable, undisguised opposition had developed within the PLA to the idea of giving that position to Hu Yaobang, as Deng had wished. In fact, until such time as Deng and his associates are able to resolve this central question of who and what command the PLA there will be a major missing equation in Deng's ability to nail down an orderly succession of political authority. Deng will meanwhile have to be careful not to allow his sometimes abrasive and impetuous manner damage his goals, especially since, at age 77, he is in an overall sense less a successor Mao than a transitional leader endeavoring to channel ultimate political succession in directions of his own choosing.

14. It is from such a position of primus inter pares that Deng is seeking to reorder the Chinese Communist regime. Even as now cut back in scope, the "modernization" development programs comprise a fairly ambitious effort across the board. Perhaps more ambitious are certain of Deng's accompanying measures designed to provide the political and social prerequisites for China's economic and technical development. Here Deng and his associates are seeking to create substantial changes in the regime's ideology, organization, and policies. These leaders are:

- Trying to restructure a more effective, professional bureaucracy, in the process attempting to neutralize or bypass ineffective or recalcitrant organs of the party, the government, and the PLA—of course, packing these ranks meanwhile with reformist supporters.
- Separating technical and administrative functions and organizations from party ones, in so doing creating more specialization of function and fewer multiple portfolios.
- Revising official interpretations of the PRC's myth figure, Mao Zedong, and of his political philosophy.
- Trying to create a more formalized legal system.
- Sending many elite specialists abroad for training.
- Upgrading China's educational system, so abused in the years of the Cultural Revolution.

15. Perhaps most important, Deng and his lieutenants are now taking the drastic step of trying sharply

[1] The term, "four modernizations," refers to the present leadership's program of comprehensive national development, under way for some four years, to upgrade the quantity and quality of production in agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense.

and explicitly to cut back the swollen ranks of the PRC's civilian and military bureaucracies.[2] This is a gamble, for this ambitious effort to cut out dead wood, the overaged, and the recalcitrant will meet considerable resistance. In this scheme of Deng's the party is to remain supreme but less visible, and with its role reduced: it is no longer to monopolize all of China's life as before, but is to share influence more than it has with the state apparatus and with new, alternative bodies concerning science, technology, economics, administration, and military matters.

16. These new arrangements reflect the broad political setting in which the leadership and succession dramas are being played out in China. Most important, Mao is gone, and with him many of the patterns which characterized politics in the Maoist PRC. The extremes of earlier debate and factionalism have been narrowed. There is more confidence and less paranoia present among elements of the PRC's leadership: for example, there is less concern about the imminence of military attack by the USSR; there is satisfaction that China has now been widely accepted as a major power; and there is a hope that China's leaders have made the Cultural Revolution a thing of the past. The focus of much of China's domestic political attention has meanwhile shifted to improving the quality of life in the PRC, and in the regime's present effort to create what it calls "spiritual socialism" in China.

17. It should be noted that such new characteristics mark the Beijing and the top leadership scenes much more than they do the broad provincial and rural settings which still contain the bulk of China's population and officialdom. With certain exceptions—Guangdong and Shanghai, for example—traditional roots are much stronger in the provinces, patterns more set, bureaucrats more wary, and skepticism of great new national initiatives more pronounced. "Succession" will certainly not be worked out alone by competing players in Beijing, but in interaction with growing institutional interests there and throughout the country, and with greater influence exerted from provincial and local levels.

[redacted]

The Principal Players

18. ***Deng's Putative Successors.*** While Deng has not named Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang his designated successors, by making them party Chairman and Premier, respectively, and by according increasing responsibilities to them, Deng has in fact arranged an implicit succession scheme which the Chinese clearly recognize. The outcome of this succession scheme of course remains uncertain. Hu and Zhao are both officials of considerable ability, but Zhao has gained his experience primarily at the provincial level, and neither is as yet widely known in his own right as a national figure nor are they apparently backed up by extensive senior cadre support of their own. At the moment they remain satellites of and front men for Deng. They have been increasingly called upon to make authoritative statements for Deng, but it is noteworthy that in so doing they have been careful thus far generally to invoke Deng's name or that of the party's Central Secretariat in laying down what the official line is to be on key issues.

19. Of the two, party Chairman Hu Yaobang (now about 66) has been a close associate of Deng since the 1940s, far longer than has Zhao. Hu gained much of his early experience in Deng's home base, Sichuan Province, then had years of senior party assignments in Beijing, was purged during the Cultural Revolution and again in 1976, together with Deng, and at last was

[2] There are no reliable figures on the total size of the PRC's officeholders, party and government, at the national, provincial, and local levels. The Chinese Communist Party is known to number some 38 million at present, of whom 20 million have joined since the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Deng Xiaoping and his associates are currently cutting back the number of officeholders in both (1) the *government* apparatus—reducing the number of ministers and vice ministers, for example, from 505 to 167, bureau and department heads from 2,450 to 1,348; and (2) the *party* apparatus—reducing the total staff by 17.3 percent. There have been a few recent public statements that Deng and his associates propose to reduce the total size of the party.

rehabilitated and elected to the Politburo in 1978 and to General Secretary of the party in 1980. A sometimes self-effacing official, Hu concentrates on rebuilding a party wracked by the Cultural Revolution. In so doing he appears to enjoy Deng's full trust.

20. By contrast, Premier Zhao Ziyang (now 62) is a smooth, urbane official who generally projects an attractive image and self-confident manner. He comes from a privileged background and served as an agricultural expert and then party first secretary in Guangdong Province before being purged in 1967 in the Cultural Revolution. Rehabilitated in 1971, he was stationed in Inner Mongolia until April 1972, when Zhou Enlai transferred him to Guangdong Province and then—in late 1975—to Sichuan Province, where Zhao became the top party and government official. Zhao gained repute in Guangdong and Sichuan, deservedly or not, for successfully introducing a number of far-reaching improvements in agricultural production, economic integration, administrative decision-making, and the combining of agricultural, industrial, and commercial enterprises—indeed almost prototypes of certain of the measures he and Deng have since initiated at the national level. He became a full Politburo member in 1979, and Premier in 1980. He has traveled to Europe, the Near East, Southeast Asia, and Japan, and has had occasional responsibility in the past for foreign policy or military matters. His foreign policy role seems clearly to be on the increase, marked especially by his recent meetings with Tokyo's leaders. Essentially a technocrat and administrator to date, Zhao is a skilled and valuable expert, not yet the holder of prime political power. He has certain of the attributes of a Zhou Enlai, but Zhao's principal asset at the moment remains the support of Deng, whose trust was early shown in him when in 1975 Deng made him the top man in Deng's own home base of power, Sichuan—just a very few years after Zhao had been paraded in the streets as a Cultural Revolution enemy of the people.

21. The party and government reorganization and personnel changes announced in May 1982 clearly strengthen Hu's and Zhao's position in the bureaucracy. The streamlining of government, in particular, generally promoted men who share their views, and some, like Vice Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian and Secretary General of the State Council Du Xingyuan, have close personal ties to Hu and Zhao respectively. Just as important, a number of men who could be expected to challenge Hu and Zhao or their policies in a succession fight lost some of their access to the bureaucracy. Specifically, some 28 past associates of Hu can now be identified at very senior national party or government posts.[8] Unlike Hu's associates, Zhao's are generally in economic and technical ministries and not in positions of great political power. Zhao nonetheless does enjoy contacts with a few very senior officials, the venerable Ye Jianying for one, which Hu does not. As significant as these gains are for Hu and Zhao, however, they are little more than a beginning. They must further strengthen their grip on the bureaucracy, especially over such control organs as the party Organization Department and the Central Discipline Inspection Commission. They must also cultivate or place supporters in key military positions.

[8] That is, directors or deputy directors of Central Committee organizations, officials of the State Council, ministers or vice ministers, ambassadors, or senior members of the Chinese Academies of Sciences or of Social Sciences. See annex B for details.

Table 1

Numbers of Associates of Party Chairman Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang Who Are Known Currently To Hold Major National-Level Positions

	Hu	Zhao
CCP Secretariat	1	0
State Councilor	1[a]	0
Director, CCP Central Committee organization	4[b]	1
Deputy Director, CCP Central Committee organization	5	1
Adviser, CCP Central Committee organization	1	0
Minister	3	2
Vice Minister	6	5[c]
Secretary General, State Council	0	1[d]
Deputy Secretary General, State Council	1	1
Adviser, State Council	0	1
Vice Chairman, National People's Congress	1	0
Official, State Council organization	1	2
Ambassador	2	0
Official, Chinese Academy of Sciences/Academy of Social Sciences	2	0
	28	14

Table 2

Numbers of Associates of Party Chairman Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang Who Are Known Currently To Hold Senior Provincial-Level Positions

	Hu	Zhao
First Secretary	3	1
Secretary/Deputy Secretary	7	12
Governor	0	2
Mayor	1	0
Vice Governor	3	9
Director, CCP Committee organization	0	1
Deputy Director, CCP Committee organization	0	1
Vice Chairman, People's Congress	0	2
Director, Government organization	0	4
Deputy Political Commissar, Military Region	0	1
Deputy Commander, Military Region	0	1
	14	34

22. Another chief political lieutenant of Deng's who may figure prominently in the succession picture is Wan Li (about 65), now a member of the party's Central Secretariat and the senior vice premier. He was one of only two of the original 13 vice premiers to retain his position, and he is one of the few political figures who still hold both senior party and government posts. A close associate of Deng's since the 1950s, Wan was purged twice by the Maoists. He has a reputation as an excellent administrator.

23. Deng's principal lieutenant for military matters is Yang Dezhi (now about 71), currently PLA Chief of Staff, having succeeded Deng in that position in February 1980. He is not only the PLA's ranking officer, but serves on two major policymaking bodies of the party (the Secretariat and the Military Commission) and is in addition a Vice Minister of Defense. Deng has long had military and political confidence in Yang, who now supports Deng's policies within the PLA. Also, Yang has had greater contact with the outside world than have most of the PLA's top officers

24. ***The "Moderates."*** Among the disparate and unorganized skeptics of Deng's policies are a number of distinguished old guard leaders, many of whom continue to have leading roles in China's economic life and political life. These leaders worry less about the direction of Deng's reforms than their pace and scope. They are concerned lest his drastic reforms undermine the party's prestige and position in Chinese society and impact adversely on China's social order.

25. Prominent among such figures is party elder Chen Yun (about 78), whose responsibilities include overall long-term economic planning, organization work, and party work style. He is influential with various factions because he has never been an assertive rival of anyone's. Active in the party since the 1920s, and a top leader off and on since the 1950s, Chen continues to side with Deng at various junctures, and

shares Deng's desires to reverse many of the Cultural Revolution's legacies, to moderate the myth of Mao, and to draw pragmatically from a variety of economic models. He nonetheless is a more orthodox Communist economic planner and represents a separate stream within the top leadership at present. He often goes along with Deng but on occasion regards him as too venturesome and not sufficiently committed to strong central control of the economy.



26. More clearly independent, though in sharply failing health, has been another party elder, Li Xiannian (about 75). Until 1980, he was China's second-ranking vice premier, senior economic planner, and the vice premier with the longest continuous service. As fifth-ranking party leader, he has frequently stood in for Deng on formal occasions, and has considered himself Deng's equal. Li's strength in part has stemmed from his long service and his role as spokesman for central economic ministries that stand to lose influence if Deng and Chen succeed in decentralizing economic decisionmaking. Li's political fortunes have been in decline since 1980, and he now is critically ill and inactive. Li himself is unlikely to pose serious problems for Hu and Zhao much longer, but other advocates of strong central planning and Soviet-style economic development are still present in the leadership and will fight rearguard actions.

27. ***The Political and Military Opponents of Deng and His Associates.*** A loose coalition exists whose dissimilar members argue for a limited return to the past. These groupings of officials, who often have little in common other than a mutual skepticism concerning Deng and his reform measures, include, respectively: (a) the surviving Cultural Revolution remnants who formerly centered around Mao's apparent designated successor, Hua Guofeng; (b) certain "conservative" old guard party and security service elements who would prefer a more Stalinist PRC; and (c) certain elements of the conservative military hierarchy. None of these figures champions a return to a new Cultural Revolution, but together they do constitute a considerable body of doubt about the wisdom and pace of Deng's "reformist" policies, more skeptical and more doctrinaire than Chen Yun and other of the "moderates" discussed above.

28. For his part, Hua has had to relinquish his two former supreme posts to Deng's handpicked successors—the premiership to Zhao and the party chairmanship to Hu. And since giving up those positions in 1980-81, Hua has suffered further setbacks and is now the lowest ranking member of the Politburo's Standing Committee. Hua retains some residual strength in the middle levels of the bureaucracy, but he has never been able to build a strong personal base of support among key figures, his fortunes seem clearly to be declining, and, unless a succession crisis should occur in the near future, Hua's chances of playing a significant post-Deng role will probably dissipate.

29. Significant opposition to Deng's broad reform programs comes from certain military elements. Opposition to Deng from within the PLA is not constant, total, or cohesive; it varies from issue to issue and, from time to time. Many PLA leaders understand why military modernization has been given a lower priority in Deng's programs, and they also support his efforts to gain Western military technology and to modernize and regularize the PLA. Certain of the younger PLA elements are themselves reformist, and in any case are eager to replace the old guard leaders who have dominated the PLA for so long. Many leading elements of the PLA nonetheless constitute a bulwark of conservative constraint. Deng has blunted earlier sharp PLA criticism by moving in the past year to take greater account of PLA views and interests, but the sources of discontent among PLA leaders are deep-seated and ma..., among them:

— Since the mid-1960s, some elements of the PLA played a key political role: the high command of

the PLA became the "guardian" of the political, social, and economic status quo during the Cultural Revolution, and afterwards it openly and bluntly spoke of its role as the guardian of the "correct" political line. This political role eroded during the 1970s and has accelerated under Deng. He has pressed the PLA to give up its political role and concentrate instead on performing its professional duties.

— Some PLA figures are displeased that military matters have the lowest priority in China's "modernization" programs, and that economic emphasis has shifted from heavy industry to agriculture and light industry.

— Some PLA leaders consider Deng's semi-liberalizing of public debate a threat to army rank-and-file discipline and to social order. They feel that Deng has carried criticism of Mao too far, and they point to events in Poland as an exampl of the unforeseen disasters that can flow from radical changes such as Deng's. Such PLA leaders similarly consider that his policies permit far too many "dangerous foreign influences" to undermine the patriotism and moral fiber of China's youth.

— Many PLA leaders have had trouble with Deng over bread-and-butter issues. Agricultural reforms stirred resentment when the dependents of military men were forced to rely on their own efforts rather than support from the communes in which they live, a real disadvantage with their able-bodied men away in the service. The party made special efforts to improve this situation, only to be faced with new resistance from within the PLA to forced retirements and demobilizations. Senior officers remain reluctant to surrender the perquisites that come only with rank and authority.

30. It should be noted that except for some disgruntlement over what certain PLA leaders consider Deng's "too soft" tactics toward Washington's Taiwan policies, there seem to be few significant differences at present between Deng and PLA leaders over foreign policy questions. The same appears to apply with respect to security and strategic issues: that is, how best to defend China against military attack. Also, Deng derives support from within the PLA on certain issues. He has some backing, for example, from PLA leaders who desire a more professional army along modern lines, with a restored rank system, less party control, and an emphasis on quality over quantity; and who agree with the need to limit military expenditures in the short term in order to provide more resources for China's modernization programs. These supporters believe that, once a suitable economic infrastructure has been erected with foreign technical assistance, China can later proceed to accord greater attention to developing its military power along more modern lines. This thread of reasoning has a long history in the PLA extending back to the 1950s; it was overshadowed during the Cultural Revolution when Mao's doctrine of People's War held full sway, with its stress on a more politicized army with greater party control. Today's PLA "modernists" are endeavoring to move Deng more clearly into a position which holds that the doctrine of People's War must take into account the military realities of the late 20th century.

31. Ye Jianying, a revered military leader who chairs the PRC's National People's Congress and holds other leading party and military posts, symbolizes the attempt of old-guard military leaders to maintain the PLA's prestige, and has exercised significant constraining influence within both the Army and the Politburo. On the other hand, he has supported Deng's call for reform of the bureaucracy despite what that will entail for senior PLA leaders. Ye could reappear to thwart a particularly contentious Dengist reform, or other PLA figures might attempt to do so in his name, but for the moment Ye appears content to withdraw from active political maneuvering. In any event he is in failing health, and may no longer be able to constitute a direct political force.

32. ***The Dissidents.*** By the regime's admission, some 2 to 5 percent of China's population are outspoken disaffected critics, dismayed that Deng and his

associates have not gone further than they have in condemning Mao's excesses, permitting freer discussion in China. and the like. Party Chairman Hu Yaobang has dismissed them, outwardly at least, as "monkey-like clowns." But old Ye Jianying has cautioned that, if there are 2 percent of China's 1 billion people who fit this category, this still means that the regime has millions of dissenters with which to deal. These dissidents are at present a disparate lot without organization, power, or coherent program; they have been silenced for the moment, and they seem unlikely in the near future to have any effect on national policies. Their criticisms have nonetheless been intense. They have struck some responsive chords among the public. They may come to influence some of the PRC's urban policies. And, since many of these dissidents are youths, their grievances in time will come to constitute a considerably greater problem to China's leadership than they do at present—and especially so if the well educated among them are not constructively absorbed into the system in the meantime.



The Nature of the Opposition Deng Xiaoping Faces

33. The situation is not so much one of maneuvering for power by particular factions or top leaders, one of whom may ultimately unseat Deng and his associates, as it is of his being circled by a host of constraints on his freedom of action and leadership potential. Some of these constraints exist among the top leadership, although most such opposition at present takes the form of hesitance or braking action, rather than head-on collision, and it comes generally on certain specific issues, with sometimes differing or shifting coalitions of leaders. Other, more fundamental constraints arise from China's great basic problems and would similarly face any Chinese leader. Still other constraints stem more from the specific circumstances of Deng's particular position and policies: of these, great "opposition" to Deng comes simply from the skepticism present among the millions of civilians and military officials throughout the country who comprise China's governing cadres. Unless Deng can

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The problem of rejuve ting cadre work style is the most difficult one facing Deng, since it is doubtful whether the old injunctions to work hard and sacrifice oneself for the Socialist cause will ever reignite the elan of earlier days.

Paraphrased opinion of source (#1) within PRC officialdom, January 1982 (Secret Noforn Nocontract Orcon)

. . . . There are too many people doing nothing . . . all of this has reached an absolutely intolerable state . . . we lack regular methods of employing, rewarding and punishing, retiring, dismissing and getting rid of cadres; all of them have an iron ricebowl, no matter how well or how badly they perform.

Deng Xiaoping, August 1980, to an enlarged meeting of the CCP's Politburo (*Hong Kong Chan Wang*, 16 April 1981)

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succeed in overcoming inertia, imparting constructive momentum, and weeding out vast layered fiefdoms, they may have the power to thwart his initiatives and those of his successors.

C. Leadership in the 1980s

34. Particular personalities, factions, and policies aside, China's continuing basic problems will face all of China's leaders alike, will affect their political succession, and will in turn be affected by that succession. These basic issues, which in a sense set the framework for the working out of succession, are these:

- How are China's leaders to bridge the chasm between the PRC's goals and capabilities?
- How can China's leaders lead if the giant machineries of state do not follow?
- How can a discredited party mobilize China's population—and especially its alienated youth—to create a great new China of tomorrow?
- How can China's leaders relax authoritarian controls, in an effort to spur the nation's creativity and productivity, without setting loose forces which—as in Poland—may further undermine the ruling party's authority?
- How can a relatively weak China best ensure national security?

35. Given such formidable problems, there will almost certainly be some continuing, shifting combinations of leaders, and some continuing cyclical swings between relative freedom and relative repression. In this situation the outside world should be prepared for the possibility that succession in China could take any of many forms: a continuation of more-or-less present Dengist leadership; a somewhat more cautious regime such as that represented, say, by Chen Yun; a compromise leadership, forced by adverse circumstance, in which stagnation and repression might become keynotes; the avowedly ideological perspectives of a neo-Maoist regime; or even an explicitly PLA regime.

36. Hu and Zhao still have a long way to go before they will be able to stand alone. The policy changes they symbolize may possibly be beaten down. And in any case the sooner Deng dies or falls, the greater the difficulty they will have in dominating a succession situation:

- If Deng should die, become incapacitated, or leave the scene in the very near future, say, over the next year or so, the first impulse of PRC leaders would probably be an assessing of how successful and acceptable his new measures had been. China might turn inward for a period, with somewhat of a vacuum developing in foreign policy making. Any one of a number of successors, or successive successors, might come to power in such a period of drift. And it cannot be excluded that in such circumstances an ideologically motivated leadership might come to the fore.
- It is more likely, however, that a collective succession of some kind would result, a grouping which included Hu and Zhao, Chen Yun, and various centrist party and PLA leaders. The likely presence there of Hu and Zhao, despite their earlier lack of much support independent from that of Deng, would be due to such political progress as they would have made to that date, recognition of their implicit succession status, the lieutenants they had succeeded in bringing in to senior posts, the fact that Hu and Zhao (with Deng) had been succeeding in filling up the center of Chinese politics fairly well, and the general reluctance of all on the Chinese scene to revive the extreme politics that marked the Cultural Revolution years and the prolonged succession struggle that went on for years during Mao's long decline.

37. It follows that the longer Deng remains in place, the greater the chances that Hu, Zhao, and like-minded pragmatists will dominate the succession. Deng also has stated that he hopes to retire from active politics by 1985. If by about that time Deng has been able to maintain at least his present degree of authority, then the most probable transfer of political authority would be one in which Hu and Zhao (or others picked by Deng) would succeed to a primus inter pares type of leadership situation. Should such a scenario take place, it should be noted, this would constitute the only successfully arranged political succession in China in this century.

38. No confident estimates are justified as to what would occur then, for, in addition to the domestic and

foreign circumstances of the time, the question would soon arise as to whether the succession of Hu and Zhao was to be one of shared authority, or of one superior to the other partner, or of just one leader alone. There are countless precedents in Chinese history for just one leader, and some precedents (imperial, republican, and PRC) for a prime technician associated with the boss—the most recent example, Mao and Zhou Enlai. Zhao Ziyang has some of the makings of a Zhou Enlai. But Zhao is a tough, able official who might outlast Hu. One thing is clear: there are no examples in Chinese history of truly shared top authority.

39. In any event, the succession leadership would continue to face a fundamental agenda that in many respects would not be significantly different for some years from that of the present. Further, China's leadership—whether Hu and Zhao or others—will begin progressively to be one whose perspecti es have been formed largely by post-1949 events. As compared with the generation that produced Mao, Zhou, and Deng, their prestige will tend to less, their power bases more institutional in nature, and their retention of leadership even more dependent on personal networks of power that can withstand setbacks suffered. A new generation of leaders somewhat deficient in charisma, legitimacy, and unity will tend at least initially to be cautious and bureaucratic, both in makeup and tactic. At the same time, as compared with Mao and his Long March generation, China's coming leaders will have been more exposed to technological and urban problems, as well as to the outside world. In any case, the generating of mass support for them and for their programs will be difficult in a situation where economic development, the centerpiece of the PRC's current policy package, will almost certainly proceed too slowly and distribute benefits too unevenly. Not least, elements within the PLA will probably remain a brake on social and political innovation, as well as the ultimate arbiter of civil disorder and, in extremis, perhaps of political succession itself.

40. Within this general context, ***the style and domestic policies*** of a Dengist-type succession would probably have the following tendencies:

- A leadership with a predisposition to gradualist policies forged through consensus. A government system marked by competition among rival institutions and interests, a more technical society.
- Continued nationalistic emphasis on "China" and the Chinese "motherland"; little faithfulness—other than lipservice—to ideology.
- But with ideological and conservative military cadres—keepers of the torch of orthodoxy, tradition, discipline, and stability—retaining sufficient residual influence to constitute continuing brakes on the nature and pace of reform.
- The unique PLA-party closeness, forged by war and revolution years ago, would continue to give way, with the new military leadership becoming more professional, and the political leaders making the military more of a state instrument.
- More provincial and local influence upon Beijing politics and policies.

41. If a Dengist succession indeed occurs, its ***foreign policies*** will resemble those of the present, but with these particular tendencies:

- An increase in the importance of security issues, as the gap widens between Chinese and Soviet military capabilities—and some of China's particular weapons systems continue to be outclassed by even those of Vietnam.
- A desire to avoid renewed border hostilities with either the USSR or Vietnam.
- A continuance of correct—but not cordial—relations with the United States: an arm's length partnership in which the question of Taiwan remains a divisive one, with continuing PRC criticisms of the United States and its policies, tough bargaining, and occasionally difficult Chinese behavior.
- A gradual increase in economic ties with the West, Europe, and Japan, to the limit of China's resources, but still constrained to limit substantial Western participation in China's economic life.
- Continuing Chinese emphasis on and rhetoric concerning Third World matters.
- Exploration of ways and means to lessen the present level of hostility with the USSR—but with no fundamental change in Beijing's basic anti-Soviet orientation.
  - — There are small pockets of opinion or influence within China, which would champion the prac-

tical benefits of more normal relationships with the USSR, but there is no ambiguity in Chinese thinking about the character or aims of Soviet policy. Furthermore, Deng's opening to the United States and the West—with its concomitant explosion in emphasis upon English language training in China—is and will probably remain a basic national orientation for some time, despite certain present Chinese attacks on the "corrosive" effects of the "open door" to the United States and the West.

The only difference that can be found between them (Brezhnev and Soviet leadership) and the Czars is that limited by its strength. Czarist Russia sought hegemony in Europe; Soviet hegemonists, however . . . aimed at establishing their hegemony over the whole world.

Beijing's party journal, *Red Flag*, 1 September 1981

— Nonetheless, there appears to be a body of opinion among Chinese leaders (of various persuasions) that certain practical benefits would flow from a more normal relationship with the USSR, and that the present level of border hostility with the USSR must be lessened, if only to increase Chinese diplomatic flexibility. The influence of such opinion will probably grow somewhat, dependent as well on how ham-handed or subtle the policies of Brezhnev or his successors are toward China meanwhile; and, to lesser extent, on how Beijing can lessen the level of its hostility with the Soviets without jeopardizing any significant Chinese interests with Washington.

42. Over the next few years, the above prospects could vary significantly in the less likely event that critical setbacks should occur in development or security affairs—beyond the level or nature of those anticipated by Deng and his associates—which produced a backlash regime of some kind. Such a regime could be of varying makeup, possibly including even some of the present Dengists. The most extreme such case would be a backlash regime headed by Stalinist-type conservatives, possibly in association with a number of security service and certain senior PLA officers. The outlook for such a regime, or series of regimes, would probably be fairly bleak, having been born of critical national setbacks of some sort. Leadership stability and continuity would doubtless suffer. What remained of the Dengists would constitute the new oppositionists. In all, the PRC probably would have entered a new and extended time of troubles.

43. The ***style and domestic policies*** of backlash successor regimes might tend to these characteristics:

- No turning of the clock back to Cultural Revolution extremes, but greatly increased reliance on ideological orthodoxy and coercive power.
- A clear predisposition to favor the military and heavy industry at the expense of light industry and consumer concerns.
- Renewed emphasis on "red" at the expense of "expert." With this, a harsher treatment of China's intellectuals, scientists, and technicians—especially those with exposure to the West.
- A return to more intense leadership factionalism and instability.

44. The ***foreign policies*** of such backlash regimes might tend to these characteristics:

- The preservation of some ties to Western economic and technical support, but within an increased overall disposition favoring less foreign involvement. There would be greater reluctance in contracting for new plants and technology, in establishing rules for foreign participation in the development and exploitation of China's resources, and in sending students abroad for advanced study.
- A more xenophobic China.
- More truculent foreign policy rhetoric, though in the main continuing actual prudence.
- Compared with Dengist successors, a cooler relationship with the United States.
- Compared with Dengist successors, perhaps less chance of reducing the levels of hostility with the USSR.

D. Consequences for the United States

45. In general terms, many Chinese questions of significance for US interests can be expected to contin-

ue in more or less present patterns over the next few years almost regardless of which leaders—except extremist ideologues—come to dominate the succession in China. That country will be poor and will be developing only slowly. Population growth will press increasingly on the limited resources of China. Its leaders will wish the Chinese people to maintain less than full and meaningful economic and social contact with the outside world and with foreigners. Those leaders will probably not return China to Cultural Revolution patterns, nor will they alter the primacy of the party or China's basic authoritarian system. The pace and patterns of present development programs may shift from time to time, but those efforts will probably neither collapse China's economy nor produce a development miracle. Chinese politics and domestic policies will probably avoid extremes, held somewhat in check by still deeply felt wounds from the political past and by the inertia of China's vast bureaucracies. China's foreign policy will meanwhile remain fairly prudent: despite occasional loud beatings of gongs and cymbals, the country will remain too absorbed in its many domestic problems to be very interested in foreign adventurism. Its leaders will probably become more outspokenly independent, and will not hesitate to criticize numerous aspects of American life, style, and policy. Not least, the PRC will remain intensely nationalistic.

[The idea of China's ministers during the Opium War (1840-42) to] "use foreigners to overcome foreigners" was aimed at resisting foreign aggression, safeguarding national independence and achieving the aim of disintegrating the enemy by exploiting the contradiction between the aggressors and adopting different measures to deal with them in accordance with different conditions. . . . Undoubtedly, this strategy of "using foreigners to overcome foreigners" must be affirmed.

Beijing *Enlightenment Daily*, 23 November 1981

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46. The question of Taiwan will remain a special case of difficulty in Sino-US relations. Beijing's leaders—any leaders—will never give up their ambition to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. They consider that the revolution they won in 1949 remains unfulfilled as long as Taiwan has not been joined to the "motherland." Frustration continues because Taiwan is so near and yet so far—beyond the ability of the PRC to conquer or to cajole in the foreseeable future. The Taiwan question will also retain high importance to the PRC's leaders as a ready litmus of US intentions. Within this framework, there might be somewhat greater opportunity for Washington to resolve, finesse, or get by specific Taiwan problems with a pragmatic regime than with a Stalinist or extremist one of some kind.

On 1 February 1662, a large army led by our outstanding national hero Zheng Chenggong [Koxinga], with the keen cooperation of the people of Taiwan, drove away the Dutch aggressors that had occupied Taiwan for 38 years, thus bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland. . . . Anyone who wants to separate Taiwan from the mainland is hated by the people and cannot be forgiven.

Beijing *Worker's Daily*, 1 February 1982

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47. Taiwan apart, experience suggests that a regime dominated by Hu, Zhao, or similar pragmatists would probably benefit broad US interests more than would a more strident PRC:

- The Deng government is a relatively known commodity to the United States, at least as Chinese regimes go. A similar successor regime would tend to be also. American officials would probably have a better feel of what to expect in the way of Chinese conduct, as compared to less predictable and more unstable successor regimes.
- Despite occasional serious difficulties between Washington and Beijing, the strategic interests of

China will probably keep it and the USSR basically at odds for some years; there will continue to be areas of coincidence in Chinese and US interests during the period of this estimate; and Dengist successors would probably tend to continue to cooperate with the United States—albeit with many frictions—in various ways against a common Soviet adversary. Backlash Chinese successor regimes would almost certainly also be anti-Soviet, but their cooperativeness with the United States would doubtless be less.

- Such considerations would apply to those cases where the PRC and the United States are cooperating in the world: the value of the PRC's continuing opposition to Vietnamese and Soviet designs in Southeast Asia; PRC support of Pakistan and of Afghan resistance to Soviet invasion; PRC encouragement to Japan to resist Soviet pressures; and PRC restraining influence on North Korea.
- Some mutuality of interests between Beijing and Washington will apply, as well, concerning the continuance of certain economic, technological, and scholarly exchange benefits. These might well diminish were backlash regimes to come to power in China.
- As has been discussed, Dengist successors would probably be somewhat less difficult concerning the Taiwan question than would more strident Beijing regimes.

48. What the United States and other friendly outside powers can accomplish in affecting PRC politics and policies will be limited by numerous constraints:

- The basic primacy of Chinese domestic forces, as compared with foreign, in shaping so central a question as political succession.
- The relative poverty of China and the disinclination of its leaders to open up China too much to foreigners.
- The many realistic constraints on both China and the United States which make massive US economic or military assistance to the PRC unlikely.
- [redacted] the difficulty of predicting just how the content and the style of US policies will impact on PRC politics and policies.

[redacted]

50. It will be of considerable consequence to the United States—and to China—that political succession in the PRC will not be taking place in a vacuum, but in parallel with an accompanying succession process in the USSR. Brezhnev's successors may well be as basically hostile to—and greatly concerned about—China as are he and the present Soviet Government. The next collegium of Soviet leaders may prove more willing

than Brezhnev has been able to overcome strong constraints and make small concessions that would save face for the Chinese and facilitate a lowering of the level of Sino-Soviet hostility. Certainly Brezhnev and his successors will attempt to fish in any troubled waters of Chinese [illegible] and particularly so if China experiences [illegible] and heightened political instability.

51. In the final analysis, even though Beijing's leaders will continue to see the American connection as a necessary adjunct to the PRC's development efforts, the value to them of that connection will continue to hang importantly on their perceptions of the degree to which US world policies vis-a-vis the USSR benefit the PRC's security and strategic interests.

ANNEXES































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